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4Turkey as an Electoral Democracy
This chapter demonstrates that Turkey can be treated as a democracy, as it meets the
minimum standard. The minimum level of democracy is generally called polyarchy
(Dahl 1971), procedural democracy, or electoral democracy. Electoral democracy, the
phrase most commonly used at present, exists when competitive elections are held
periodically under universal suffrage. As long as electoral procedures are competitive
and fair, the consequences are not questioned. This concept is the conventional wis-
dom for empirical analysis since it is difficult to both debate and to realize substantive
democracy that emphasizes equality as a result of such procedures. In this chapter, the
first section discusses the objective conditions that make Turkey an electoral democ-
racy. Second, the development of Turkey’s democracy over the past fifty years is
briefly reviewed. The third section accounts for various versions of the electoral
system in Turkey that have been applied in various circumstances.
4.1. Competition and Participation in Turkey
Since 1950, Turkey has satisfied the minimal criteria of electoral democracy, or
polyarchy in effect. Dahl’s widely accepted criteria on polyarchy (1971) basically
consist of (1) public contestation and (2) political participation. The first criterion was
met in 1950 with the holding of a free and fair general election that brought about a
change of government for the first time since the establishment of the republic in
1923. In only six out of the fifteen elections from 1946 to 2002 did the same party
become the first party as in the previous election (Table 4-1). Competitive elections
thus have been practiced in Turkey for the last half century.
It is true that Turkey experienced direct and indirect military interventions in 1960,
1971, and 1980.1 The primary aim of those interventions, however, was not the
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establishment of an undemocratic regime but rather to restore order in a dysfunctional
democracy. Bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes that took power in other relatively
developed democracies in the Third World lasted seven years on two occasions (1966–
73 and 1976–83) in Argentina, 21 years (1964–85) in Brazil, 17 years (1973–90) in
Chile, and 12 years (1973–85) in Uruguay. In Turkey, the military rule lasted one year
during the 1960–61 period and three years for the 1980–83 period while the 1971
indirect “intervention by memorandum” inaugurated supra-party civilian govern-
ments. Moreover, despite the previous military interventions, there is a general con-
sensus in Turkish society that government legitimacy rests on the trust of citizens
represented by free and competitive elections (Özbudun 1987, pp. 353–54).
For the second criterion, universal suffrage was nominally achieved in 1934 when
women were given suffrage, which hitherto had been restricted only to men. Parlia-
mentary elections, however, were conducted in two stages. Voters could only elect
electors, who would then elect parliamentarians. Representatives in the parliament
then were only indirectly representative of the voters, on top of the fact that they were
one-party elections. With the introduction of party competition in 1946, voters be-
came able to vote directly for parliamentary candidates, and thus the second require-
ment was fully met (Tuncer 2003, p. 108–10).
TABLE 4-1
GENERAL ELECTIONS AND CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT, 1946–2002
General Incumbent(s) First Partya
Election after the Election ?: Same as the Last
?: Different from the Last
1946 CHP ?
1950 DP ?
1954 DP ?
1957 DP ?
1961* CHP, AP ?
1965 AP ?
1969 AP ?
1973 CHP, MSP ?
1977 CHP ?
1983* ANAP ?
1987 ANAP ?
1991 DYP ?
1995 ANAP, DYP ?
1999 DSP ?
2002 AKP ?
Source: Compiled by the author.
* Transition elections after military rule (1960–61 and 1980–83).
a The first parties are the same as the incumbents after the general election with the excep-
tion of the first party in the 1995 election, the RP.
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In addition to this minimum requirement for the participatory feature of electoral
democracy, other forms of participation such as the freedoms of speech, association,
assembly, and demonstration also have existed with relatively few limitations. Politi-
cal parties, associations, and foundations can be established without permission al-
though if they are deemed to threaten the existence of the republic due to their goals
regarding class, religion, sect, or ethnicity, they can be subject to abolition by judicial
procedures.2 In all, however, these restrictions do not fundamentally violate the condi-
tion of associational autonomy, defined by Dahl (1989), which emphasizes the inde-
pendence of organizations rather than unlimited freedom, stating that “citizens also
have a right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, including
independent political parties and interest groups” (p. 221, italics added). Thus, the
Turkish political system satisfies the basic criterion for electoral democracy, or
polyarchy, and internalizes some of the even more demanding conditions for demo-
cratic politics.
4.2. The Development of Turkish Electoral Democracy
This section overviews the development of Turkish democracy with particular refer-
ence to constitutional regimes.3 Since electoral democracy is the analytical arena of
this study, it is essential to understand how various political forces in Turkey coa-
lesced or struggled with each other to create or change constitutional regimes over the
last half century.
Transition to a multiparty system in 1946. The political background for the intro-
duction of electoral democracy in Turkey can be dated at least back to an earlier
attempt at democratization immediately after the Second World War. In the 1946
general election, Turkey made a transition from the one-party system dominated by
the CHP, founded by the national leader, Mustafa Kemal, to a multiparty system. The
electoral outcome gave the governing CHP a bare majority to remain in office, but in
the following 1950 general election, the CHP had to give way to the emerging DP,
which had originated from a splinter group that broke off from the CHP.
Tyranny of the majority ends in a coup. Turkey’s experiment in democratization,
while bringing about a change of governing parties, did not engender institutionalized
relations between the government and opposition. The DP, which won consecutive
general elections in 1954 and 1957, grew increasingly authoritarian (as well as anti-
secular) while in government, and began to use repression toward the parliamentary
and extra-parliamentary opposition, especially the CHP.4 The political turmoil culmi-
nated in 1960 when a student-led protest movement prompted the DP government to
declare martial law in Istanbul and Ankara. In Ankara, army cadets joined the antigov-
ernment demonstration. The government ordered the military to fire on the demon-
strators, but it refused and instead toppled the government in a coup.
Shared constitution-making. The military ruled Turkey temporarily from 1960 to
1961, and during that time it participated with civilians in the process of drafting a
new constitution. A bicameral Constitutional Assembly, composed of equipotent mili-
tary and civilian chambers, was created in 1960. Members of the civilian chamber
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(Assembly of Representatives) were chosen by indirect election, cooptation, or quota,
and represented various functional groups as well as political parties excluding the
banned DP. When the military chamber (National Unity Committee) did not entirely
approve of the text of a bill passed by the civilian chamber had passed, or when the
civilian chamber did not approve of the changes which the military chamber made to
a bill’s original text, the Constitutional Assembly would hold a joint session. Since the
civilian chamber had more members than the military chamber, the former held the
advantage in such voting (Özbudun 1993, p. 31).
Constitutional rule against the tyranny of the majority. The 1961 constitution was
formulated in reaction to the DP era when the government was able to trample upon
the supremacy of the constitution and basic human rights. The 1961 constitution
differed from the previous 1924 constitution in terms of the relative importance it
placed on the following. First, the notion of democracy shifted from majority rule to
pluralism. The 1961 constitution advocated pluralistic democracy based on the prin-
ciples of (1) the supremacy of the constitution, (2) the separation of powers and
system of checks and balances, and (3) the structural development of a pluralistic
society. Second, it also sought to expand and to strengthen basic human rights. Third,
the concept of the social state held the state responsible for securing social peace and
justice while also justifying active intervention by the state in the social and economic
activities of the nation (Özbudun 1993, p. 17–22). This constitution has been regarded
as the most liberal in Turkish history.
Political instability and a new constitution. The regime of the 1961 constitution,
however, survived for no more than two decades. In the late 1970s, political violence
between the right and left escalated. In September 1980, the military intervened and
declared martial law nationwide. It perceived defects in the 1961 constitution, which
it said had led to a divided parliament and weak governments as well as to political
violence associated with a proliferation of political groups and trade unions. The new
leadership then monopolized the drafting and promulgation of the new 1982 constitu-
tion. In the new bicameral Constitutional Assembly, the military chamber (National
Security Council) had the power to reject or amend the text which the civilian cham-
ber (Consultative Assembly) had approved, and those rejections or amendments did
not have to be sent back for review to the civilian chamber (Özbudun 1993, p. 31).
In comparison with the 1961 constitution, the 1982 constitution (1) was more
casuistic or specific in details, (2) was more difficult to change, (3) had many more
transitional clauses to protect from subsequent revision the laws and decisions made
by the military government, (4) shifted the balance between authority and freedom
towards the former, (5) strengthened the executive branch, (6) sought to avoid dead-
locks in the political decision-making mechanism, and (7) was less lenient towards
participatory democracy (Özbudun 1993, p. 35–44). In sum, it was designed to sup-
port a strong central government at the expense of the greater political freedom set
forth in the previous constitution.
Re-democratization and fragmentation. The civilian transition election in 1983 was
carefully controlled by the military regime. Only in 1987 were all the parties able to
participate in the general election. At the same time, the Motherland Party (Anavatan
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Partisi, ANAP), the only surviving participant in, as well as the victor of, the 1983
election, ruled Turkey alone until 1991. When it lost the 1991 general election, there
was no strong alternative to replace it. The 1982 constitution thus turned out to be no
guarantee of political stability. Instead, Turkey once again entered a coalition era in
the 1990s. The party system became fragmented so rapidly that by the late 1990s even
the largest two parties combined were unable to garner 50 percent of the vote. The
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) won the 2002
general election with 34.3 percent of the vote and 66.0 percent of the seats but its
success owed much to voter punishment of the incumbents.5
4.3. Electoral System
This section examines the electoral system in Turkey, mainly in terms of seat alloca-
tion (Table 4-2). From the first multiparty election in 1946 to the last general election
(in 1957) before the 1960 military intervention, a majoritarian system with multimember
constituencies was used for the unicameral legislature, the Turkish Grand National
Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM). All the constituency seats were
allocated to the winning party in the constituency consisting of one province. This
system favored the first party so strongly that the DP that came to power in 1950 with
an overwhelming majority in the parliament and was able to pass any law, constitu-
tional or not.
After the military overthrew the “tyranny of the majority” in 1960, the 1961
constitution, drafted jointly by civilians and the military, adopted the principle of
checks and balances. This principle was embodied as the bicameral legislature (1961–
80) elected by the proportional representation system with multimember constituen-
cies.6 For both the national assembly, TBMM, and the senate, Cumhuriyet Senatosu,
constituency size was determined in proportion to the population of the province that
constituted one constituency.7
While the 1961 electoral law (Law No. 306) basically followed the d’Hondt sys-
TABLE 4-2
ELECTORAL SYSTEM IN TURKEY, 1946–2002
Year Version Proportionalitya
1946–1957 Majoritarian 1
1961 d’Hondt with constituency hurdle 5
1965 National remainder 7
1969–1977 Simple d’Hondt 6
1983 d’Hondt with double hurdles 3
1987–1991 d’Hondt with double hurdles and contingencies 2
1995–2002 d’Hondt with the national hurdle 4
Source: Adapted by the author from Tuncer (2003, pp. 117–26).
a
 Proportionality is rank-ordered by the author from lowest = 1 to highest = 7.
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tem,8 the seat allocation system was subject to frequent revisions due to political
calculations by the incumbent.9 The 1961 electoral law originally stipulated a mini-
mal vote threshold for a constituency in order to avoid party fragmentation. No seats
in a constituency were given to parties that failed to gain a total amount of votes
calculated as the total votes in the constituency divided by the number of seats in the
constituency. The original intention of the law was reversed in 1965, when the na-
tional remainder system was introduced. Under this system, the votes below the
constituency threshold were pooled as the national remainder to be reallocated to all
the parties by the d’Hondt system. The first incumbent at the time, the CHP, wanted to
prevent the popular AP from gaining a majority seats in the next (1965) general
election.
In the late 1960s, however, the electoral system swung back to disproportionality.
For the elections from 1969 to 1977, a simple d’Hondt system with neither constitu-
ency threshold nor national remainder was applied. It started when the AP, which had
come to power in 1965, passed a law in 1968 to abolish the national remainder system
and to revive the constituency threshold. The minor Turkish Labor Party (Türkiye I.s¸çi
Partisi, TI
.
P), which would have faced a heavy blow from this legislation, resorted to
constitutional review. The result was nearly a defeat for the TI
.
P. The Constitutional
Court upheld the abolition of the national remainder, while repealing only the reintro-
duction of the constituency threshold as being unconstitutional (due to the loss of
equality in representation).
The 1980 military intervention left a lasting imprint on the electoral system in the
post-1980 era. The 1983 Law on Election of the Members of Parliament (Law No.
2839), which was first applied for the transition election, reflected the 1982 constitu-
tional regime and brought about change from the abolished 1961 electoral law. First,
it set two hurdles with the aim to eliminate minor parties. One was the requirement
that parties had to win at least 10 percent of the national vote to obtain any seats in the
parliament. The other was the same constituency threshold as was used from 1961 to
1965. Second, but less importantly, the districting system was changed so that rural
provinces would be more overrepresented relative to urban provinces. One seat was
allocated to each province without regard to population size, and then the remaining
seats were allocated in proportion to population, but with the initial requirement that
each province would have at least one seat. Provinces that were entitled to more than
seven seats were divided into plural constituencies with no fewer than three seats.
Even after the transition to the civilian government, incumbents continued to meddle
with the electoral system for political expediency. Prior to the 1987 general election,
“contingency seats” were introduced for the provinces that had more than one con-
stituency with between four and six seats.10 In these constituencies, one seat was to be
allocated to the first party in the constituency. By doing this, the incumbent ANAP
tried to, and actually managed to, secure a majority in the face of declining popularity.
Prior to the 1995 general election, the incumbent as well as other mainstream parties
apparently feared that the emerging pro-Islamic party might gain a parliamentary
majority. As a result of amendments to the electoral law and of their repeals,11 (1) the
constituency threshold was lifted, (2) the contingency seats were abolished, and (3)
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the ceiling on constituency size was raised from 6 to 1812 so that the system became
more proportional in effect. This system remains in force to this day.
4.4. Summary
Turkey has been an electoral democracy since 1950. Competitive elections led to
frequent changes of government. The long history of universal suffrage and emerging
associational life provided a backbone for electoral democracy, although “excesses of
freedom” were later curtailed by the state. Two brief military interventions sought to
restore the functions of parliamentary democracy while two different remedies, one
liberal and the other repressive, were applied to the two cases. For the electoral
system, the proportional representational system since 1961 has been subject to
various changes due to political expediencies. The most serious obstacle for represen-
tation has been the 10 percentage national threshold for parliamentary seats.
Note
1 The “February 28 Process” (28 S¸ubat Süreci) has often been described as a postmodern or
soft coup. During the National Security Council meeting on February 28, 1997, the military
members demanded from pro-Islamic Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan strict measures
against the growth of Islamists, while referring to unspecified sanctions if the measures
were not implemented. However, the subsequent fall of Erbakan’s coalition government in
June was precipitated largely by waves of antigovernment demonstrations that involved a
range of forces from labor to business organizations. See Hazama (1999, pp. 86–91).
2 For the history of the regulation and deregulation of associational life in Turkey, see
Hazama (1999).
3 The following brief historical account was adapted from Hazama (1996, pp. 316–18).
4 The DP government confiscated an important part of the CHP’s real estate in December
1953, modified the law governing the press to increase control over newspapers in June
1956, and banned CHP activities for three months in April 1960.
5 For more details on post-1980 developments, see Chapter 7.
6 Except for the first senate election in 1961 to which the majority system was applied.
7 For the senate since 1964, Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir had three constituencies.
8 The seat allocation under the d’Hondt system proceeds as follows. First, the votes for each
party are divided by one, two, three, . . . , and n. Second, the quotients thus obtained for all
parties are sorted in descending order regardless of denominator size. Third, the first seat is
allocated to the party with the largest quotient, the second seat to the party with the second
largest quotient, and so forth until the n-th seat.
9 The following explanation relied on Tuncer (2003, pp. 230–43), Tekeli (1983), Sabuncu
and S¸eker (1996), and T. C. Bas¸bakanlık (various years).
10 In the same amendment, the maximum number of population-proportional seats for a
constituency was lowered from seven to six due to the introduction of contingency seats.
11 Initially the government passed a bill that would limit the constituency threshold to 25
percent of the vote. After a group of opposition parliamentarians referred the new law to the
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constitutional court, the law was repealed as unconstitutional. The government passed
another bill that would further limit the constituency threshold to 10 percent. But then the
president referred the new law to the constitutional court, which eventually annulled it.
Since no other relevant legislation was made, the constituency threshold was thus effec-
tively lifted. See Tuncer (2003, p. 123).
12 Only when a province was entitled to over 18 seats, it would be divided into two constituen-
cies for 19 to 35 seats and into three constituencies for 36 or more seats. Regarding this
change in the electoral law, the DYP-CHP caretaker government explained that there was
not enough time to adjust constituency sizes according to the latest population census,
which had to be completed in 1995 but could not be published until 1997. This was the time
when two-round voting such as in France was being discussed by political parties (except
for the pro-Islamic RP) but was not realized.
